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An important component of the current debate about agriculture trade negotiations 
is whether further liberalization of trade and agricultural policies may help or hinder food 
security in WTO member countries.  These concerns were formulated first, in Article 20 
of the Agreement on Agriculture negotiated during the Uruguay Round, which indicated 
that negotiations should take into consideration, among other things, ￿non trade 
concerns￿; and in its preamble, which mentioned as examples of those concerns, ￿food 
security and the need to protect the environment￿.   They were also reaffirmed in the 
Doha Declaration, which declares that ￿the long-term objective￿ is ￿to establish a fair and 
market-oriented trading system through a program of fundamental reform￿, and 
confirmed that special and differential treatment will be granted to developing countries 
￿to effectively take account of their development needs, including food security and rural 
development￿. 
 
Although the issue of food security and agricultural negotiations within the WTO 
has been raised both by industrialized (￿multifunctionality￿ of agriculture) and 
developing countries, the discussion in the case of developing countries has included 
important policy objectives such as elimination of poverty and hunger (as cause and 
consequence of food insecurity).  Concerned with the effects that further negotiations 
would have on the attainment of those objectives in poor countries, several developing 
countries have proposed the creation of a ￿Development Box￿ or a ￿Food Security Box￿.  
 
To contribute to this debate, the paper surveys and discusses in greater detail three 
main aspects of trade liberalization and food security within the WTO: the adequacy of 
the current WTO classification of countries according to their food security situation; the 
policy perspectives in industrialized countries and in developing countries; and the legal 
issues faced by developing countries.   
 
The paper concludes that a better classification is needed within the WTO to 
target food insecure countries, that many food security concerns can be addressed with 
specific clarifications and changes in the current language of the AoA, and that although 
developing countries may not be legally constrained to invest in food security, they lack 
the financial, human, and institutional resources to do so. 
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The Agreement on Agriculture negotiated during the Uruguay Round of 
international trade negotiations stipulated in Article 20 the need to continue agricultural 
negotiations within the World Trade Organization (WTO), beginning in the year 2000.  
At Doha, in November 2001, WTO members launched multisectoral trade negotiations, 
including agriculture as part of a single undertaking.  An important component of the 
current debate about those negotiations is whether further liberalization of trade and 
agricultural policies may help or hinder food security in WTO member countries.  
Although Article 20 only indicates that those negotiations should take into consideration, 
among other things, ￿non trade concerns￿, the preamble to the Agreement mentions as 
examples of those concerns, ￿food security and the need to protect the environment￿.
 1  
The Doha Declaration, after reaffirming that ￿the long-term objective￿ is ￿to establish a 
fair and market-oriented trading system through a program of fundamental reform￿, 
confirmed that special and differential treatment will be granted to developing countries 
￿to effectively take account of their development needs, including food security and rural 
development￿ (Doha Declaration, paragraph 13). 
While usually the preoccupation with economic liberalization and food security 
has centered on developing countries (Pinstrup-Anderson 1990, Commander 1989, and 
Sahn et al. 1997), some industrialized countries have also included food security concerns 
as part of the idea of ￿multifunctionality￿ of agriculture, a concept that some WTO 
members have argued should be considered during the negotiations.
2 
                                                 
1 The text of Article 20 indicates that negotiations would take into account:  ￿(a) the experience to that date 
from implementing the reduction commitments;  (b) the effects of the reduction commitments on world 
trade in agriculture; (c) non-trade concerns, special and differential treatment to developing country 
Members, and the objective to establish a fair and market-oriented agricultural trading system, and the 
other objectives and concerns mentioned in the preamble to this Agreement; and (d) what further 
commitments are necessary to achieve the above mentioned long-term objectives￿ (GATT 1994, p. 55). 
2 The basic idea of multifunctionality is that agriculture, in addition to supplying the obvious direct 
products, also generates positive externalities including food security, environmental conservation, rural 
landscape, employment, and vital rural communities.  A policy conclusion from this line of analysis is that 
the government could justifiably intervene with subsidies and protection to agriculture to ensure an 
adequate supply of the postulated externalities.  The notion of multifunctionality has led to some 
controversy, including the fact that other productive sectors may also have multifunctional properties and 
the nature of the policies that may help generate the postulated externalities without affecting other 
countries (for a general discussion, see FAO 1999b, OECD, 2001; and Diaz-Bonilla and Tin, 2002; for 
country perspectives see Abare 1999, European Union 2000, Norway 1998, and USDA 1999).   
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In consequence, the issue of food security and agricultural negotiations within the 
WTO has been raised both by industrialized and developing countries.  For richer 
countries that are net food importers, the discussion centers, in part, on whether there 
exists some ￿adequate￿ proportion between total domestic food production and the level 
of trade needed to satisfy food requirements at the national level, and whether the 
continuation of the negotiating process may place undue constraints on attaining the 
desired ratio of imports over domestic production (Japan and the Republic of Korea, 
2000).  Those ratios may be linked to some notion of insurance in an uncertain world, or 
national autonomy to be able to confront outside pressures, or both.  It is much less clear 
what would be the basis for claiming food security concerns in the case of industrialized 
countries that are net food exporters.   
In the case of developing countries, the discussion is broader, including whether 
important policy objectives such as elimination of poverty and hunger (as cause and 
consequence of food insecurity) may have been helped or hindered by the current AoA, 
and whether further negotiations may improve upon the existing text or will further 
compromise the attainment of those objectives in poor countries.  Several developing 
countries have presented their concerns about food security issues, including the 
possibility of special and differential treatment embedded in a ￿Development Box￿ or a 
￿Food Security Box￿ (WTO b and c).  
To properly address those concerns there are at least two questions to consider: 
first, what is the relevance of the current classification of countries in the WTO with 
respect to their food security status; the second is whether the current legal texts, which 
define WTO commitments on the basis of those categories of countries, are adequately 
considering food security concerns through the AoA special and differential treatment.  
Both questions are related: if the categories are badly defined to capture food security 
concerns, then it is unlikely that the different treatment under WTO rules will deal with 
those concerns in a meaningful way.  But even if those categories capture the variety in 
the situations of food (in)security, current WTO rules and commitments may still need 
adjustments to take into account the problems of food insecure countries.  
The paper is organized as follows.  The next section briefly discusses the notion 
of food security and analyzes different channels through which changes in agricultural  
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trade may affect food security. A short background on food security trends follows. The 
rest of the paper discusses in greater detail three main issues related to WTO 
negotiations: country classification according to their food security situation; 
protectionism and subsidies in industrialized countries; and domestic policies for food 
security in developing countries.  The paper closes with some concluding remarks.  
 
FOOD SECURITY AND NUTRITION SECURITY 
 
Food security can be analyzed at the global, national, regional, household, and 
individual levels (Figure 1).  Since the World Food Conference of 1974, the focus has 
been moving from the initial concerns about food availability at the global and national 
levels to those aspects that affect food access and utilization at the household and 
individual levels, where issues of food security emerge in a more concrete way (Maxwell 
1996).  The importance of poverty and lack of income opportunities in food insecurity 
was highlighted early (Sen 1981).  In addition to the trend level of food availability, its 
variability around that trend for both food supply and access, and its sustainability over 
time were increasingly emphasized (Maxwell 1990).  It was further argued that food 
intakes should provide for more than mere survival: they have to support also an active 
and healthy life (Maxwell and Frankenberger 1992).  The 1996 World Food Summit 
included several of those components of the notion of food security when it accepted the 
definition that ￿food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and 
economic access to sufficient, safe, and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and 
food preferences for an active and healthy life￿ (FAO 1996). 
But availability and access are only preconditions for adequate utilization of food.  
They do not determine unequivocally malnutrition (or nutrition insecurity) at the 
individual level (Smith 1998, and Smith and Haddad 2000).  For instance the measure of 
malnutrition utilized by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO, 1999a) (which is 
based on calories availability at the national level, doubly corrected by the gender and 
age structure of the population, and by the consumption or income distribution profile of 
the country), shows a highly significant correlation with national food availability 
measured by national consumption of calories per capita, but is more weakly correlated  
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with ￿deeper￿ measures of malnutrition, such as the percentage of child malnutrition 
based on anthropometrical measures (Smith 1998).  Analyzing nutrition insecurity at the 
individual level (utilizing child malnutrition as the indicator) requires the consideration of 
other determinants (Smith and Haddad 2000).  Figure 1, shows some of the links between 
trade and trade policies, on one hand, and food security and nutrition security, on the 
other.   
Trade influences both world food availability, as well as production and food 
imports (including food aid) at the national level (the latter two aspects defining national 
food availability).
3  Food availability is a component of the more specific notion of food 
security, and it has been shown to have a positive correlation with declines in 
malnutrition (Smith and Haddad, 2000).  But trade and trade policies may also have an 
impact on the rate and variability of growth, as well as its ￿quality￿ (i.e. the employment, 
income distribution, and poverty effects).  Income opportunities, along with food 
availability, define food security at the household level. Another important channel of 
influence of trade and trade policies is through government revenues, directly as 
collection of trade taxes and indirectly through the impact of the rate and quality of 
growth on general tax collection (Winters 2000a and b).  The level of government 
revenues affects the possibility of implementing transfer policies (like food subsidies or 
other poverty-oriented programs) and to finance public services and investments in 
health, education, and related areas.  Looking at the individual level, malnutrition 
depends on food security (i.e. household and individual food access), as well as other 
determinants such as the quality and quantity of care (which is mostly related to women￿s 
education and women￿s relative status in the society) and the health environment 
(including health services and infrastructure) (Figure 1; for a more detailed discussion see 
Smith and Haddad 2000).   
Certainly food and nutrition security take a more concrete form at the household 
and individual levels, where they are heavily influenced by such determinants as income 
distribution and women￿s status in society.  Yet trade negotiations within WTO are 
                                                 
3 It should be noticed that the Agreement on Agriculture of the WTO, covers not only agricultural trade 
policies but also domestic agricultural policies.  Therefore, the ￿Trade￿ circle in Figure 1 can be understood 
as including in addition to trade and trade policies, the legal framework for domestic agricultural policies, 
as embedded in the WTO obligations.   
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conducted at the national level, and special and differential treatment is granted to 
categories of countries.
4  Therefore, part of the discussion that follows, which focuses on 
the implications of food security as a non-trade concern for possible changes in the WTO 
legal framework, particularly the Agreement on Agriculture, takes in several instances a 
national perspective.  This is particularly the case for the cluster analysis of countries 
based on food (in)security indicators, which utilizes national averages of 
 consumption, 
production, and trade measures. 
 
TRENDS IN FOOD SECURITY 
 
Food security appears to have improved, on average, over the past four decades.  
Total food availability in developing countries, measured in daily calories and grams of 
proteins per capita, was about 30 percent higher at the end of the 1990s than in the 1960s, 
even though the world population almost doubled during that time (Table 1 and 2).  The 
number of malnourished children under five (a better indicator of food problems than 
average food availability) declined between the 1970s and the mid-1990s by about 37 
million (see Table 3), and the incidence of malnutrition dropped from 47 percent to 31 
percent (Smith and Haddad 2000). 
 
Other points to be noticed are: 
 
•  Food availability in developing countries comes mostly from domestic production: 
imports were about 15 percent of total food production in the 1990s (up from 10 
percent in the 1960s and 1970s) (Figure 2).  
•  Food trade, along with food stocks, contributed to reduce the variability of food 
consumption in developing countries to about 1/3 to 1/5 of that of food production 
(Tables 4, 5 and 6). 
                                                 
4 Although skewed income distributions and bias against women would certainly modify results based on 
national averages, it seems doubtful that a country can claim special and differential treatment on trade 
negotiations because it is discriminating against women and the poor through other policies and 
institutions.     
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•  The burden of the total food bill (measured by food imports as a percentage of total 
exports) declined on average for developing countries from almost 20 percent in the 
1960s to about 6 percent in the 1990s (Figure 3).  This was caused by the expansion 
of total trade, which has grown faster than food imports, along with a decline in real 
food prices.  
•  Volatility of real agricultural prices in world markets in the last half of the 1990s￿
since the implementation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) agricultural 
agreements￿does not seem to be higher than for the whole period since the 1960s 
(Table 7).  It is less clear what has happened to the volatility of agricultural prices 
within developing countries, which also depends on domestic policies. 
 
However, although food security has improved in general, there are regions and countries 
at risk, and some have become more food insecure: 
 
•  Average food availability is still low for regions such as sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).  
And for more than one-fourth of all developing countries, per capita indicators have 
decreased since the 1960s (Table 8).  In most cases those declines appear to be 
associated with war. 
•  The number of malnourished children under the age of five has actually increased in 
SSA, and the incidence of malnutrition is still very high there and in South Asia 
(Table 3). 
•  For the least-developed countries (LDCs), the total food bill has remained high at 20 
percent (Figure 3), and several developing countries with large external debts face 
additional constraints in financing their food imports.  
 
In summary, while aggregate trends of food security indicators for developing countries 
seem positive, the situation is deteriorating in several cases.  There appears to be a variety 
of food (in)security situations across countries, which require a more disaggregated 
analysis. This issue is discussed next.  
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VARIETY OF FOOD SECURITY SITUATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR WTO 
NEGOTIATIONS 
 
  The heterogeneity of country cases for food security analysis raises the question 
of the adequacy of the WTO country categories to address that non-trade concern. There 
are four main categories with some bearing on the issue. In addition to the basic 
distinction between developed and developing countries, the WTO recognizes two other 
groups within developing countries: LDC, a United Nation (UN) classification; and Net 
Food Importing Developing Countries (NFIDC), which are selected through the 
Committee on Agriculture of the WTO.  The category of LDC has several legal 
implications under the WTO framework, and both types of countries were considered in a 
special Ministerial Decision on agricultural issues (the ￿Decision on Measures 
Concerning the Possible Negative Effects of the Reform Program on Least-developed 
and Net Food-Importing Developing Countries￿) approved at the end of the Uruguay 
Round.
5 
The question is how well those four categories capture the heterogeneity of 
developing countries for food security concerns. Diaz-Bonilla et al. (2000) try to answer 
that question using various methods of cluster analysis (including an approach based on 
fuzzy sets) and data for 167 countries to identify groups of countries categorized 
according to five measures of food security: food production per capita, the ratio of total 
exports to food imports, calories per capita, protein per capita, and the share of the non-
agricultural population.
6  To avoid giving more weight to any one variable because of its 
unit of measure, variables were converted to z-scores (subtracting the mean and dividing 
by the standard deviation).  The results identify 12 clusters of countries according to their 
similarities in their food security profiles (measured by the variables listed above) from 
very food insecure, cluster 1, to very food secure, cluster 12 (Table 9).   
                                                 
5  See D￿az-Bonilla, Piæeiro, and Thomas (1999) for a more detailed discussion of these groups.  Other 
categories with legal implications for the WTO are not related to agricultural issues. The Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO) also defines Low Income Food Deficit Countries (LIFDCs), but they are 
not subject to any special treatment or legal consideration under the WTO.   
 
 
6 The indicators utilized in the study are considered proxies for three elements of food security at the 
national level: food availability, access, and utilization.  
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Clusters with centers (in z-score values) falling below -0.5 (minus half a standard 
deviation from zero) are defined as ￿food insecure￿.  Clusters 1, 2, 3, and 4 fall in that 
category.  Clusters 5,6,7, and 8 have most of their variables in the ￿0.5 to +0.5 range 
(plus or minus half a standard deviation around zero).  They are considered to be in the 
￿food neutral￿ category.  Finally, clusters 9, 10, 11, and 12, with most of the variables 
above +0.5, are considered ￿food secure￿.   
Figure 4 illustrates the relative position of the 12 clusters in a diagram where the 
average value of the z-score variables for the combined consumption of calories and 
proteins, is plotted against the trade indicator showing the burden of the food bill (also in 
z-score values).  The solid lines at the values of ￿0.5 across both axis of the chart divide 
the space into 4 main quadrants separating the food insecure clusters from the rest (the 
dotted lines at the +0.5 values add other quadrants differentiating among clusters that are 
food neutral or food secure):  clusters 1 and 2 appear in the quadrant that is consumption 
vulnerable and trade stressed (Southwest quadrant), with values below ￿0.5 on both 
dimensions; cluster 3 is in the Southeast quadrant, which shows consumption 
vulnerability but not trade stress; cluster 4 is in the trade stressed quadrant but is above 
the level of ￿0.5 for consumption (Northwest quadrant).  The rest of the clusters appear in 
the intermediate or high levels of consumption and trade security (Northeast quadrant), 
with both dimensions above the ￿0.5 value. 
Cluster 1 includes the most food insecure countries. They show the lowest levels 
of availability of calories and proteins per capita, and of food production per capita.  
Their food imports use more than 20 percent of their total export earnings, compared to 
the world weighted- average of 6 percent, and they are predominantly rural  (only about 
23 percent of the population is urban, Table 9).  This group includes 30 countries, all of 
them LDCs, except Kenya, a country classified as NFIDC by the WTO.  They are mostly 
from Africa (23 out of the total 30).  They include 21 WTO members and 4 WTO 
observers (Table 10). 
Cluster 2 includes food insecure countries with an urban profile.  Those countries 
show somewhat higher levels of consumption and production than cluster 1, but they are 
still ￿consumption vulnerable￿ and also trade stressed.  The main difference is that these 
countries are far less rural than those in other food vulnerable clusters: in fact, on  
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average, more than 70 percent of the population is classified as urban (see Table 9). 
7  
This raises the issue of urban food insecurity, which has its own special characteristics 
(see Garret and Ruel 2000).  While countries in the previous cluster, being mostly rural, 
may be more concerned about food insecurity in the countryside and the impact of 
agricultural imports on poor agricultural producers, in countries with larger urban 
populations (like those in cluster 2), and where conceivably an important percentage of 
poor and food insecure groups may be urban dwellers, there is a clear trade-off for 
policies aimed at agricultural trade protection: they may maintain higher incomes for 
poor producers, but they may also act as a tax on poor consumers (both effects depending 
on other policies and the interaction of markets and institutions).
8  Among the 14 
members of this cluster, two are LDCs from Africa and five are NFIDCs (mostly from 
Latin America).  The other seven members are basically former republics of the ex-Soviet 
Union and Latin American countries.  Except for Tajikistan, all of the countries are either 
WTO members (11) or observers (2)  (Table 10). 
Cluster 3 includes food insecure countries with consumption vulnerability.  This 
cluster has availability of proteins and calories below cluster 2, but is better off than 
cluster 1.  It is also slightly below cluster 2 in production (but above cluster 1), and it is 
as rural as cluster 4.  The main characteristic is that the burden of the food bill over total 
exports is at an intermediate level.  This cluster can be characterized as consumption 
vulnerable but trade neutral, the mirror image of cluster 4, discussed below (Figure 4).   
Cluster 3 includes 17 countries, 4 of which are LDCs and 2 are NFIDCs.  All 
belong to the WTO as members or observers, and are developing countries in Africa, 
Asia, and Latin America (Table 10).  Three countries from the Cairns Group appear in 
this group (Bolivia, Guatemala, and the Philippines).
9   India, Namibia, the Philippines, 
and Viet Nam are also in Cluster 3.  These countries have a low incidence of the food bill 
                                                 
7 The variable for urban/rural population is not shown in Figure 4.   
8 The case of vulnerable rural groups that are net consumers of food must also be considered, even in 
Cluster 1.  
9 The Cairns Group is a negotiating block of agricultural exporting countries that has argued for greater 
liberalization in world agricultural markets.  The current 18 members are Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Fiji, Guatemala, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, 




on total exports (i.e. they are not ￿trade stressed￿): about 5 percent for India and Viet 
Nam, and about 6 percent for Namibia and the Philippines.  Except for the Philippines, 
these countries are all net food exporters.  Some of them may also exemplify a possible 
policy dilemma: because those countries have a low food import bill they could expand 
food imports to improve their low levels of consumption; but at the same time, because 
they have large poor agricultural populations, there is concern regarding the impact of 
additional food imports on those rural groups.  
Cluster 4 is composed of food insecure countries with trade vulnerability.  While 
the previous cluster had low consumption but intermediate levels of trade burden, cluster 
4 shows the opposite profile: it has intermediate levels of consumption but it is very trade 
stressed; in fact, this group has the heaviest trade burden with a food bill of almost 21 
percent of total exports.  Figure 4 shows cluster 4 in the trade stressed quadrant but with 
an average consumption of calories and proteins above not only Clusters 1, 2, and 3, the 
other food insecure groups, but also the food neutral Cluster 5.  Cluster 4 has 13 
members, including five LDCs and three NFIDCs.  All of them except one are WTO 
members or observers.  Although the inclusion of some bigger countries in this group 
(such as Pakistan, Sudan, and Senegal) conform to the notion of having intermediate 
consumption but being trade stressed, the classification of some small islands from the 
Caribbean and the Pacific in this group is less clear.  This may simply reflect lack of data 
regarding exports of services (like tourism) and/or the fact that the urban/rural distinction 
does not have the same meaning in small islands as in bigger countries. 
  The rest of the countries are classified as food neutral or food secure. 
10 The 
conclusion is that some of the categories utilized by the WTO appear inadequate to 
capture food security concerns.  This seems to be the case of the category of  ￿developing 
countries￿: they appear scattered across all levels of food (in)security, except cluster 12, 
the highest ranked among the food secure groups (Table 10).  This fact has implications 
for the definition of a ￿Development Box￿ as different from a ￿Food Security Box￿ (see 
below)  
                                                 
10 In Diaz-Bonilla et al, 2000, the case of some countries classified in food neutral clusters, but with a high 
burden of food imports over total exports is also discussed. A special situation is Egypt, a NFIDC that 
because of the level of trade stress may be counted among the food insecure.     
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  In the category of NFIDCs, 10 (or 11 counting Egypt as food insecure) out of the 
18 countries are in food insecure groups (clusters 1 to 4); the remaining 8 (or 7 without  
Egypt) are in food neutral groups (clusters 5 and 7), which have intermediate levels of 
food security.  Being a net food importer appears to be only a weak indicator of food 
vulnerability.  Some countries may be net food exporters but still have a larger 
percentage of their total exports allocated to buy food, and vice-versa (for example, Mali, 
an LDC, is a net food exporter but its food bill is about 15 percent of total exports, while 
Venezuela, a NFIDC, spends about 5 percent of total exports on imported food).  
Additionally, some countries may be net food importers just because of a dominant 
tourist industry (like Barbados, which also has the highest income per capita of the 
NFIDCs, about US$7,000).  Other NFIDCs have important levels of oil exports (such as 
the case of Venezuela, and Trinidad and Tobago) and therefore imports of food only 
reflect the comparative advantages of their production structure.  With the exception of 
Egypt, food imports of the NFIDCs in the food neutral group represent about nine percent 
of total exports; for the food insecure NFIDCs (including Egypt), the average is about 16 
percent. 
  The category of LDCs, on the other hand, does correspond broadly to countries 
suffering from food insecurity, even though food security criteria were not explicit in 
their definition.  Only three out of the 43 LDCs covered in this study are not among the 
first four clusters of most vulnerable countries.
11  At the same time, some countries, like 
Kenya, have a food security profile similar to the more vulnerable LDCs but are not 
included in this category, although it is a NFIDC.  Others, such as El Salvador, Georgia, 
Mongolia, and Nicaragua (all WTO members), which have somewhat better profiles but 
are still in the food insecure categories, are neither LDCs nor NFIDCs.     
In terms of the WTO negotiations, this analysis suggests that using the category of 
LDCs to define specific rights and obligations in the WTO for food security reasons 
appears an appropriate starting point. Yet, some countries classified as food insecure by 
the cluster analysis are neither LDC nor NFIDC and are therefore now excluded from 
                                                 
11 Cape Verde, Maldives, and Myanmar are in clusters 6 and 7. However, as in the case of Egypt, the first 
two countries show high levels of the food import bill compared to total exports. Therefore, they could also 
be considered among the food insecure countries (see the full discussion in Diaz-Bonilla et al, 2000). That 
would leave Myanmar as the only non-food insecure among the LDCs included in the cluster analysis.  
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WTO special treatment.  A category of food insecure countries based on quantitative 
indicators (which would include all LDCs plus those NFIDCs that are food insecure, plus 
other food insecure countries according to the selected indicators), would correct that 
exclusion. There is still the issue of NFIDCs that are not food insecure.  The current 
category of NFIDCs, a classification negotiated during the Uruguay Round, has some 
implications as defined in the Ministerial Decision, and constitutes an acquired right. 
Even if a special category of food insecure countries is defined, all the NFIDCs would 
still have the general rights under that Decision, but only those that are food insecure 
would receive special and differential treatment for food security reasons.   
It is also relevant to address the issue of food security raised by some developed 
countries as part of the notion of  ￿multifunctionality￿ of agriculture, or, more generally, 
in the non-trade concerns.  The cluster analysis classification, however, shows, 
unsurprisingly, that developed countries are all concentrated in the food secure groups 
(clusters 9 to 12). Therefore, the term ￿food security￿ seems to be utilized with different 
meanings in developed and developing countries.  In terms of policy implications and the 
agricultural negotiations, maintaining the same label for two altogether different 
situations only obscures the issues being negotiated.  The discussion of food security 
should be limited to the vulnerability of developing countries, using a different 
terminology for developed countries￿ concerns.   
In summary, the implication of this analysis is that there is a need for a better 
definition of food insecure countries, based on objective quantitative indicators.  Those 
food insecure countries should be granted special and differential treatment limited to 
food security considerations, but those concessions should not change the balance of 
other rights and obligations for LDCs and NFIDCs that have been agreed for reasons 
other than food security. 
But even if an adequate category of food insecure countries is defined, there is 
still the question of what are the changes in the legal texts of the WTO that can address 
those food security concerns.  In discussing those possible changes, it is important to 
keep in mind a distinction between what is legal under the WTO and what are the 
economic implications of those legally available measures.  In this regard, an obvious 
point (which is sometimes overlooked) must be stressed: the fact that a country has legal  
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room under WTO rules to follow a specific policy does not mean that such policy is 
adequate in terms of general welfare and equity (for that country and/or for others).  The 
next sections cover both legal and economic aspects, trying to distinguish, when 
necessary, those aspects related to achieving what may be seen as a fair and balanced 
outcome in legal terms, and the efficiency, welfare, or equity merits of those 
commitments.  
 
TRADE, TRADE LIBERALIZATION, AND FOOD SECURITY: POLICY PERSPECTIVES  
 
The discussion about trade liberalization and food security can be divided into 
those aspects that relate to the agricultural policies of industrialized countries and those 
that apply to developing countries. This distinction corresponds to two broadly different 
approaches for the negotiations that developing countries may follow (and in fact have 
been following in different degrees): one is to play ￿offense￿ and try to open up markets 
in industrialized countries and limit their ability to use funds from their Treasuries to 
compete against farmers in non-subsidizing countries; the second is to use a ￿defensive￿ 
strategy, such as asking for high levels of protection for themselves and the possibility of 
utilizing the same (or even higher, in relative terms) levels of subsidies as the 
industrialized countries (Konandreas, 2000). In this section some of the economic policy 
issues are discussed, while the legal implications are taken up later.  
 
Trade Liberalization in Industrialized Countries  
 
It seems undeniable that the combination of domestic support, market protection, 
and export subsidies in industrialized countries has displaced agricultural production and 
exports from developing countries. Different studies before the beginning of the Uruguay 
Round in the mid 1980￿s tried to quantify the impact on developing countries of 
agricultural protectionism in industrialized countries. They usually showed substantial 
positive effects on developing countries￿ incomes, production, and exports of agricultural 
and agroindustrial products from an eventual reduction of tariffs and other forms of 
agricultural protection in industrialized countries (ValdØs and Zietz, 1980; Goldin and  
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Knudsen, 1990).  Simulation models for the Uruguay Round, as well as preliminary 
projections of possible scenarios for the current negotiations, show that agricultural and 
agroindustrial production in developing countries, as well as their net welfare, would 
increase if agricultural protectionism in industrialized countries  was reduced (Sharma, 
Konandreas, and Greenfield, 1996;  Goldin and van-der-Mensbrugghe, 1995, for the 
Uruguay Round; Hertel, et al 2000; USDA/ERS, 2001; ABARE, 1999; for the current 
negotiations). 
12  While those studies mainly project the future impact of possible 
scenarios of liberalization, other work supports similar conclusions from a historical 
perspective: they suggest important negative effects in several developing countries for 
production and employment linked to agroindustrial products such as meat, sugar, and 
canned tomatoes, as a result of industrialized countries’ agricultural policies (OXFAM, 
1987; Eurostep, 1999).   
Increased access to international trade opportunities is usually associated with 
higher growth rates for the economy, in general, and for the agricultural sector in 
particular. Scandizzo (1998) shows, in a sample of 71 developing countries, covering the 
period 1969-1991, that agricultural exports are strongly and positively correlated with 
overall economic growth. But if agriculture growth is hampered by protectionism, this 
may have important implications for developing countries to the extent that agricultural-
led growth strategies appear to have larger dynamic multipliers for the rest of the 
economy than other alternatives in poor developing countries (Delgado et al. 1998).  
Even in the success stories of the newly industrialized countries of East Asia, a common 
characteristic is that they invested strongly, and very early, in rural and agricultural 
                                                 
12 Some of those studies also raise the possibility of negative welfare effects for developing countries that 
are net importers of agricultural products, due to adverse changes in the terms of trade (Sharma et al., 
1996).   Usually, if dynamic effects are considered the negative impacts disappear (USDA/ERS, 2001).  
Also the results of the simulations change when trade liberalization in other sectors (such as industry) is 
also considered (Hertel et el, 2000), and if unemployment is assumed, rather than the usual full 
employment closure. Finally, some of the simulations of developing countries￿ gains resulting from 
agricultural trade liberalization have usually lumped fruit and vegetables together with other subsectors, 
which may have led to underestimation of the benefits, considering the growing importance of this group of 
products in LDC exports.  For instance, Islam (1990) found significant gains for LDCs of liberalization of 
world trade in fruit and vegetables.  Yet, even after the Uruguay Round negotiations, production of fruit 
and vegetables remains highly protected in several developing countries, mainly on a seasonal basis, 
allowing entry with lower levels of tariffs only when there is no domestic production (Swinbank and 




development (McCalla, 2000).  In turn, high and stable growth rates have been 
commonly associated with reductions in poverty rates, and agricultural growth tends to 
have greater impacts in the reduction of poverty  (see Lipton and Ravallion, 1995, and the 
recent reviews in Eastwood and Lipton, 2001, and Osmani, 2001).  In particular, if 
countries are following their comparative advantages, international trade by labor-
abundant poor developing countries, should help increase employment and wages, further 
alleviating poverty.  To the extent that poverty is the main cause of food insecurity, then 
international trade opportunities should also help with food security concerns.   
Other points to be noticed are that the expansion of trade in goods and services 
over the last decades, along with the decline in food prices resulting from technological 
advance, has led to sharp reductions of the incidence of the total food bill of developing 
countries as percentage of total exports (Figure 3).  Also the fact that food consumption 
variability in individual countries is far smaller than food production variability shows 
the contribution of trade to food security (Tables 4, 5 and 6).  
Therefore, a key objective for developing countries to increase economic growth, 
reduce poverty and enhance food security seems to be the elimination or the substantial 
reduction of subsidies and protectionism in industrialized countries during the current 
WTO negotiations.  This may be an especially important issue for the poorer countries, 
where two-thirds of the population lives in rural areas, agriculture generates over one-
third of the gross domestic product (GDP), and a substantial percentage of exports 
depends on agriculture (World Bank Development Indicators, 2001).   
However, against this general proposition three main reservations have been 
raised, some linked to food security concerns.  First, there is a worry that liberalization of 
agricultural policies in industrialized countries may increase the food bill of poor 
developing countries that are net food importers (see footnote 12).  A second concern is 
that trade liberalization in industrialized countries could erode the trade preferences of 
poor developing countries that have preferential access to those protected markets. Third, 
some, mostly in the NGO community, have argued that export expansion may have 
harmful effects on poverty and food security (see for instance Francisco, 2000). 
The first point is related to the fact that the combination of domestic support, 
market protection and export subsidies by industrialized countries depressed world  
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prices, hurting developing countries that were net exporters, but, it has been argued, 
probably helping the balance of payments position of developing countries that were net 
importers of those products (Koester and Bale, 1990; Sarris, 1991).  This view, however, 
does not address the distributional impact within developing countries between 
consumers and producers, and across types of households.  As importantly, it does not 
consider the employment effects from expanded production, if developing countries did 
not have to contend with subsidized and protected agriculture in industrialized countries. 
Even though agricultural trade policies in industrialized countries may have reduced the 
import bill of net importing countries, studies show that those same policies have had a 
stifling effect on agricultural and agroindustrial production in developing countries, 
regardless of their net trade position (Hertel, et al 2000; USDA/ERS, 2001; ABARE, 
1999).  Considering that those sectors are the main economic activities in many 
developing countries, particularly poor ones, and that they usually have significant 
growth multipliers for the whole economy (Delgado et al, 1998), the level of non-realized 
dynamic benefits for those countries may have been substantial. 
Rather than maintaining protection in the industrialized countries, a welfare-
enhancing approach would be to offer cash grants or other financial schemes to 
compensate net importing poor developing countries for higher prices linked to 
agricultural liberalization in developed countries.   
The second point focuses on the possible erosion of preferences for a number of 
developing countries that have special market access arrangements with industrialized 
countries.  For low-income developing countries, the preferential access usually 
represents a large percentage of agricultural exports and sectoral value added, and has 
important implications for rural employment and balance of payments. 
13  There are 
several options to compensate poor countries for the erosion in preferences that are better 
                                                 
13 The continuation of those preferences is already under threat for products such as sugar, both in the US 
and the EU, irrespective of what happens in the WTO negotiations.  For instance, in the US market, Mexico 
has expanded access under NAFTA, and will reach total liberalization by 2007/8, while in the EU market, 
the inclusion of Eastern European countries, will reduce the margin of preferences (ABARE, 1999).  The 
EU is also struggling to implement the WTO rulings related to bananas, which may change the allocation 
of quota rents across developing countries.  Both the European Union and the USA have embarked on a 
series of regional trade negotiations that will create some rents, but erode others preexistent, such as those 
generated by the Generalized System of Preferences.  
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that maintaining current levels of protection. In some cases, changing the way TRQs 
operate could compensate the erosion of preferences in the short run.  One possibility 
would be to grant import licenses to the exporting countries instead of giving them to 
domestic importers, and to reduce to zero the ￿in quota￿ tariff for those exporting 
countries.  Another possibility is to transform into foreign aid the equivalent value of the 
trade preferences.  This would mean extending to the affected poor developing countries 
the same logic applied when industrialized countries compensate domestic producers for 
the reduction in direct support.  Considering that a policy of liberalization acts as a tax 
cut for consumers in the liberalizing countries, using part of those funds may help to 
finance the compensations to poor developing countries for the lost access, and still leave 
net benefits for consumers.  
The third caveat refers to some possible scenarios under which trade expansion 
may have less benign effects on poverty and food security.  Much depends on the level, 
inclusiveness, and stability of the growth rate generated by that expanded trade.  While 
poverty in the developing world declines rapidly with distribution-neutral growth, 
deviations from neutrality may wipe out those gains for the vulnerable groups (Lipton 
and Ravallion, 1995).  Furthermore, even with neutral growth at higher rates, if its 
variability increases generating a greater likelihood of crises, then the poor may face 
significant additional downside risks, with the prospect of long-lasting damage to their 
low levels of human and physical capital (i.e. crises may force poor families to sell 
productive assets, increase the possibility of illness, or have their children drop out of 
school) (see for instance, Addison and Demery, 1989; Lipton and Ravallion, 1995).   
Within the agricultural sector, criticisms to different developments such as the 
Green Revolution, the increase in commercialization, and now the expansion of 
international trade, and more generally the process of globalization, centered on the 
possibility of negative effects on the welfare of poor producers and poor consumers, 
through diverse channels.  A moderately negative scenario would point out to the 
constraints the poor face because of lack of resources and access to technology, which 
excludes them from participating profitably in expanding domestic or international 
markets.  This exclusion may lead to the possibility of worsening income distribution, but 
not necessarily to increases in absolute poverty.  A more worrisome scenario would be if  
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the poor became absolutely worse off, and not only in relative terms.  Usually, arguments 
in support of the likelihood of this undesirable outcome suggest that the process of 
technological innovation or expansion of market opportunities may shift relative prices 
against the poor and/or reinforce the power of already dominant actors (large landowners, 
big commercial enterprises) allowing them to extract further incomes from the poor or to 
expropriate their assets.  In terms of food security, the claims of negative effects usually 
revolve around the possibility of cash or export production displacing staple crops, and/or 
that women, usually the anchor for households￿ food security, may end up with less 
decision-making power and less resources due to the technological or commercial 
changes. 
Different studies of the Green Revolution, and domestic and international 
commercialization, have addressed those concerns.  They tend to paint a more positive 
view of the process, usually showing advances for the poor, due to production, 
employment and food price effects, although recognizing that uniform attainment of 
benign outcomes is by no means guaranteed (Hazell and Ramaswamy, 1991; Von Braun 
and Kennedy, 1994; IFAD 2001, among others). Also studies for several countries in 
Africa have shown that poverty fell more among export crop producers, than among food 
producers (Christiaensen, Demery, and Paternostro, 2002; see also Kherala et al. 2001). 
With regard to gender, trade expansion that creates income opportunities for women may 
also give them greater control over expenditures, with positive impact on child nutrition 
and development, as well as greater incentives to invest in girls (Paolisso et al., 2001). 
But the impact may depend on the type of crops (for example, Fontana, 2002, shows that 
expansion of non-traditional exports in Zambia may favor women more than commercial 
ones), and there may be a trade-offs between income-generating activities and leisure 
time, and perhaps it may also affect some of the time allocated for childcare (Paolisso et 
al., 2001, Fontana and Wood, 2000).  Generally, complementary policies and investments 
are needed to increase the physical and human capital owned by the poor and by women, 
to build general infrastructures and services, to ensure that markets operate competitively, 
and to eliminate institutional, political, and social biases that discriminate against 
vulnerable groups (IFAD, 2001). 
  
  19
Trade Liberalization and Food Security in Developing Countries 
 
During the current WTO negotiations, while in general asking that industrialized 
countries reduce their levels of protection and subsidization, several developing countries 
have also indicated concerns that liberalizing their own agricultural trade may affect 
negatively those countries￿ large agricultural populations, where poverty is still 
concentrated (WTO 2000b, 2000c, and 2000d).  Developing countries have argued for a 
slower pace in reducing their tariffs (or maintaining and even increasing current levels) 
on the premise that industrialized countries should first eliminate their higher levels of 
protection and subsidies. The World Bank report on agriculture (1986) advised 
developing countries to live with those subsidies, taking advantage of lower prices for 
their consumers.  As argued before, the problem with this advice is that even though 
export and domestic subsidies in industrialized countries may reduce the import bill of 
net importing countries, those same policies would hamper the full dynamic benefits that 
a sustainable agricultural sector and agro-industrialization process can have on the whole 
economy, given a proper framework of domestic economic policies in developing 
countries.   
A separate concern is how to avoid sudden negative impacts on poor producers 
emanating from external trade conditions, whose vulnerable livelihoods may be 
irreparably damaged by drastic shocks (Lipton and Ravallion, 1995).   
Another argument utilized for holding the line on current levels of protection in 
poor countries is related to fiscal matters: the importance of trade taxes as an important 
source of government revenues may imply that trade liberalization weakens public 
revenues.  Yet, trade reforms such as moving from quotas to non-prohibitive tariffs, or in 
general the fact that trade liberalization may increase international trade, could lead to 
larger government revenues. The final impact of trade liberalization on government 
revenues is an empirical issue, and there are good economic reasons why countries, when 
the institutional framework allows it, should move towards more efficient and equitable 
forms of taxation. 
Behind those concerns there is a permanent tension in agricultural policies 
between the desire of maintaining high prices for producers and keeping low prices for  
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consumers.  Generally speaking, industrialized and developing countries have tried to 
solve this old policy dilemma rather differently.  Rich countries have used transfers from 
consumers (through border protection) and taxpayers (through budgetary outlays) to 
maintain high prices for producers (OECD, several issues). For OECD countries as a 
whole, equivalent domestic prices exceeded world prices by about 60 percent, with the 
largest difference corresponding to Norway (229 percent above world prices).  In the case 
of Japan, more than 90 percent of the transfer was paid by consumers through border 
protection and the rest by taxpayers as budgetary outlays, while in the case of the EU and 
USA the shares were about equal for consumer and taxpayer transfers (OECD, several 
issues). 
Developing countries, on the other hand, followed historically policies of low 
agricultural prices to help urban populations and further the process of industrialization.  
The role of agriculture in development was seen as supporting the needs of 
industrialization through four types of transfers: labor, food (or ￿wage goods￿) and raw 
materials, savings, and foreign currency (Johnston and Mellor, 1961). But by the mid-
1960s, several concerns arose about the adequacy of a development strategy that 
discriminated against the agricultural sector.  Schultz (1964) argued influentially that 
farmers in developing countries were "poor but efficient", reacting with economic 
rationality to changes in prices and incentives.  If agricultural resources were efficiently 
utilized, no gains could be made by transferring labor and savings to other sectors.  A 
better strategy would be to support the agricultural sector through investments in 
technology and physical and human capital formation in rural areas.  The idea of a 
technological solution to the rural problem was behind the Green Revolution of the 
1970s.  
Other studies in the 1970s evaluated critically the development strategies and 
trade regimes based on import substitution industrialization (ISI) in a number of 
developing countries (Little, Scitovsky and Scott, 1970; Balassa, 1971; and Krueger, 
1978).  They argued that ISI had a negative impact on economic efficiency and growth.  
Also, arguments about inelastic international demand ("elasticity pessimism") and 
deteriorating terms of trade began to be challenged (for an overview of those debates see 
Balassa, 1986). It was also clear that poverty alleviation in developing countries was  
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impaired by policies that protected capital-intensive industrialization and discriminated 
against agriculture, negatively affecting employment and income distribution.  The 
obvious realization that the poor in developing countries were concentrated mainly in 
rural areas, led to the conclusion that if poverty alleviation was to be an important 
objective of economic policy, then greater attention should be given to agricultural and 
rural development.  Chenery et al (1974) presented the case for an investment program 
centered on the poor, especially in rural areas.   
During the 1980’s the emphasis shifted to the need for changes in the framework 
of development and macroeconomic policies.  In particular, the combination of 
overvalued exchange rates, protection of domestic industry, and (often) explicit taxation 
of agricultural exports, were criticized for severely hindering agricultural growth, 
especially in very poor countries.  Under these assumptions, faster and more equitable 
growth would not happen until the general policy framework was revised.  The policy 
recommendation was to eliminate inefficient industrial protectionism, to avoid the 
overvaluation of the exchange rate, to phase out export taxes on agriculture, and to reduce 
government￿s involvement in agricultural markets through inefficient and many times 
contradictory interventions (World Bank, 1986).  At the macroeconomic level, policies 
underscored the need of having domestic absorption in line with production (eventually 
expanded by sustainable external financing).  These policies, when implemented, have 
usually been part of IMF stabilization programs and World Bank structural adjustment 
programs. 
The results in terms of growth and equity of those programs continue to be 
debated (see Dorosh and Sahn, 2000; and Kherala et al., 2001), but the relevant point 
here is that recent research indicates that the effects of such policy reforms have been to 
greatly reduce or, in some cases, eliminate the past policy bias against agriculture in 
many developing countries (Bautista, Robinson, Tarp, and Wobst, 1998).  Although 
further improvements in domestic policies are still needed in different developing 
countries, now the focus in those countries could turn again to investment policies and 
projects in the agricultural sector, focusing on human capital, land, water, property rights, 
management, technology, infrastructure, strengthening organizations of small farmers, 
and other forms of expansion of social capital and political participation for the poor.   
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Such an agricultural focus was largely abandoned during the period when improvements 
in the overall development strategy emphasizing economy-wide trade and 
macroeconomic policies appeared paramount (Diaz Bonilla and Robinson, 1999).  
The question, in the context of the current negotiations, is whether after having 
first discriminated against the agricultural sector, and then changed to a more neutral 
stance, developing countries should, out of concern for small farmers, move even further 
towards protection of the agricultural sector, adopting policies that are the opposite of the 
previous low-price agricultural policies.  In fact, some proposals, implicitly or explicitly 
suggest taxing consumers in developing countries to support producers, basically through 
higher levels of border protection (see Madeley, 2000).  However, considering that poor 
households may spend as much as 50 percent of their income on food (FAO, 1993), these 
recommendations could have a negative impact on the poverty and food security of not 
only the increasing number of poor urban households and landless rural workers, but also 
poor small farmers, who tend to be net buyers of food. There has been a steady shift in 
the locus of poverty, food insecurity, and malnutrition from rural to urban areas in many 
developing countries (Ruel et al. 1998, Ruel et al. 1999, Haddad et al. 1999, and Garrett 
and Ruel 2000).  Urbanization in developing countries is posing new questions regarding 
economic and social policies in general, and also in relation to the impact of trade and 
trade policies on poverty and food security.  A similar profile of trade protection (or trade 
liberalization) will have different implications for developing countries with important 
contingents of urban poor affected by food insecurity, than for other poor countries where 
a majority of the population affected by poverty and food insecurity lives in rural areas 
and works in agricultural production.  Of course there are also vulnerable rural groups 
which are net consumers of food, and for which taxes on food imports may have impacts 
more comparable to food-insecure urban groups, depending on the balance between 
possibly higher incomes and larger food costs.  The impact of prices on vulnerable rural 
groups then depends on the structure of farming system and the nature of poverty and 
food insecurity (IFAD, 2001).  
In general, an import tax has a bigger incidence on poor consumers (who spend a 
greater percentage of their incomes on food), and is received mostly by bigger 
agricultural producers, which have larger quantities of products to sell.  Also, trade  
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protection for any sector usually implies negative employment and production effects in 
other sectors, and the general effect of widespread trade protection is a reduction in 
exports. There are also dynamic considerations, such as rural-urban migration.  A policy 
completely tilted towards low prices for the consumer would damage the rural sector and 
exacerbate migration to the cities.  Therefore, a balanced rural-urban policy, which 
includes but goes beyond food prices, should consider the short and long-term 
implications of those policies.   
In summary, the policy dilemma between high prices for producers (which would 
help poor, small farmers, but also big ones, and the latter proportionally more) and low 
prices for consumers (which would benefit poor consumers, but not only them) cannot be 
wished away. The problems faced by poor farmers and poor consumers are more 
adequately addressed through policies and investments targeted to them directly, rather 
than using indirect methods such as trying to influence food prices, which inevitably lead 
to leakages (i.e. non-target groups receiving part, in some cases a substantial one, of the 
benefits) and additional distortions. 
14  The focus should be mostly on social groups 
rather than crops and their prices.  Also, given the important growth multiplier effects of 
agriculture especially in poor developing countries, policies that ignore or, even worse, 
discriminate against agriculture must be avoided.  The best approach for developing 
countries to support agriculture is to eliminate biases against that sector in the general 
policy framework, and to increase investments in human capital, land tenure, water 
access, technology, infrastructure, nonagricultural rural enterprises, organizations of 
small farmers, and other forms of expansion of social capital and political participation 
for the poor and vulnerable. At the same time, developing countries may legitimately 
insist that industrialized countries reduce their higher levels of subsidization and 
protection, and ask for policy instruments to protect the livelihoods of the rural poor from 
import shocks that could cause irreparable damage. The question in the context of the 
WTO negotiations is whether the current AoA and its possible future modifications 
would allow or limit the range of policies needed to make sure that increased trade 
                                                 
14  See among others, Pinstrup-Andersen, 1988 on consumers, and Diaz-Bonilla 1982 and 1990, on survival 
strategies and rural actors.  The issue of defining the interventions in terms of people has been lately 
emphasized again by the approach based sustainable livelihoods; see for instance Adato M. and R. 
Meinzen-Dick, 2002.  
  24
opportunities lead to adequate rates of inclusive, sustainable and stable growth, 
contributing to reductions of poverty and improvements in food security. The legal issues 
involved are discussed immediately.  
 




The AoA has been subject to several criticisms.  A valid criticism is that there are 
imbalances in the AoA because industrialized countries have been able to secure 
exemptions for some of their policies (like the Blue Box) and were allowed to continue 
using significant amounts of expenditures for domestic support and export subsidies.  
Rich countries have the legal room and the resources to implement the variety of policies 
allowed under that legal text, while developing countries, although having legal room of 
maneuver, lack the needed financial resources.   
Other criticisms of the AoA seem less compelling.  For instance, some have 
suggested that the WTO legal texts tightly constrain developing countries in legal terms, 
not allowing them to implement policies needed for their economic development, to 
combat poverty or to attain food security.  In a similar vein, it has been argued that the 
legal exemptions allowed for developing countries are of no use to them, mainly because 
the policies permitted are very difficult to implement due to the financial, technical, and 
human resource requirements (Solagral, 1999; Murphy, 1999; and UNCTAD, 2000).  
Usually, the final conclusion of this line of analysis is that developing countries need 
additional ￿flexibility￿ mainly in terms of increasing the levels of protection allowed.  
Some of those arguments appear to suggest that trade protection measures are simpler to 
implement institutionally and have no costs to the economy, compared to the budgetary 
expenditures required to implement Green Box and other policies allowed under the 
AoA. 
However, the argument that legal exemptions allowed for developing countries 
under the WTO are not very helpful because they ￿cost money￿ focuses only on the 
impact on citizens as taxpayers and ignores that tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade are  
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equivalent of taxes paid by the citizens as consumers.
15  As argued above, protectionist 
policies have real costs to the economy, with potentially important negative effects on the 
poor. Also, under the AoA developing countries do not seem to have significant legal 
constraints to adopt a variety of interventions to support agriculture, particularly 
regarding policies and programs that really improve competitiveness and equity, given 
the resources they possess.  Finally, it is not clear that the institutional requirements to 
run efficient and honest customs administrations that can adequately manage the border 
measures are less exacting than organizing, for example, an efficient system of 
agricultural research and extension.  Whatever the institutional requirements, it is obvious 
that the interventions allowed under the AoA without restrictions, such as research, 
extension, infrastructure, and irrigation, to name a few, are the real foundations for 
increases in production, productivity, and competitiveness.  Trade protection measures, 
on the other hand, are mostly internal transfers (and largely regressive in the case of 
food), with no clear link to the real sources of agricultural productivity growth.   
A related issue is the argument for increased flexibility.  In trade, and other, 
negotiations the parties usually try to limit other peoples￿ options while attempting to 
retain flexibility for oneself.  But it seems dubious that industrialized countries would 
agree to grant developing countries ample flexibility, while renouncing theirs.  Of course, 
in any balanced negotiation, all parties would become committed to some mutually 
agreed common rules.  Developing countries, as weaker players in the global arena, need 
                                                 
15 A common mistake is to view import taxes as revenues paid by foreigners and collected only by 
governments.  In fact, simple economic analysis shows that consumers usually pay the larger percentage of 
the sum of government revenues and associated transfers, and producers generally collect the larger 
percentage of those payments.  As discussed before, only a small fraction of total consumption of food 
products is imported in developing countries, but border restrictions increase prices for the total amount of 
the consumed product, which includes the larger percentage of domestically produced food resulting in a 
direct transfer from consumers to producers.  This same fact limits also the suggestion of using the receipts 
from import taxes to subsidize food consumption of the poor (FAO, 2000; paper 6; footnote 4).  To the 
extent that the volume of taxed commodities is only a fraction of total domestic consumption, and that the 
poor population may represent, as a whole, even though not necessarily per capita, a sizable percentage of 
that domestic consumption, government revenues from taxing imported commodities would typically not 
be enough to compensate poor consumers.  The case of developed countries, where the incidence of 
poverty is smaller and which have additional fiscal resources, is different.  They can tax consumers in 
general with border protection for food, but then, at the same time, are able to subsidize poor consumers 





an international legal system that limits the ability of larger countries to act unilaterally.  
The argument that the WTO is completely dominated by industrialized countries and by 
transnational corporations, fails to recognize the fact that the latter would have even more 
power without an international legal framework. Moreover, there are arguments why 
some lack of flexibility may be beneficial to developing countries (Oyejide, 2000).  First, 
the implementation of internationally negotiated rules may limit the power of special 
interests and arbitrary government measures within developing countries, helping to 
strengthen domestic legal and institutional frameworks (Diaz-Bonilla, 2000).  Second, it 
has been shown that investment is in part related to the stability and certainty of the 
policy framework (Campos, Lien and Pradhan, 1999; Solimano, 1989).  A legal 
framework, internationally sanctioned, that limits flexibility (and therefore uncertainty) 
should help investment. 
A separate issue (discussed later in this section) is whether developing countries 
should take a more deliberate and slow approach to reduction of trade barriers, 
particularly until the glaring imbalances between industrial and developing countries in 
protection and subsidies are eliminated.  There is a compelling argument to be made that 
the AoA￿with the legal possibilities allowed to industrialized countries to subsidize 
exports, to provide trade-distorting domestic support, and to otherwise engage in 
protectionist agricultural policies￿still leaves developing countries at a disadvantage in 
world markets.  Therefore, an important issue is whether the Green Box and other 
domestic support measures should be further tightened because industrialized countries, 
with their financial, human, and institutional capabilities, would abuse them.  
Still, this does not detract from the main issue that to achieve the objectives of 
agricultural development and poverty alleviation, developing countries must design 
adequate domestic policies and investment programs in human capital, infrastructure, 
technology, regularization and expansion of land ownership by small producers and 
landless workers, and, in general, promote the adequate functioning of product and factor 
markets.  The AoA does not restrict those policies.  It can be argued that the main 
problem for developing countries is not necessarily the lack of legal room for the 
implementation of efficient and equitable policies, but the need for funds (at the national 
and international levels) to be able to implement those policies, and the existence of still  
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high levels of subsidization and protection of the agricultural sector of industrialized 
countries.   
This discussion has implications for the negotiating positions of the developing 
countries.  It has been already mentioned that developing countries may play ￿offense￿ or 
￿defense￿ in the negotiations, or some combination of both.  In analyzing the merits of 
those approaches, there are at least two considerations for developing countries to ponder.  
First is the need to be realistic about the resources they have to carry out the policies 
discussed in the negotiations.  If in adopting a defensive strategy developing countries are 
asking for legal room to apply subsidies that they will not be able to use later for lack of 
money, their negotiating position may be very weak.  Industrialized countries will be 
only too happy to grant developing countries concessions that will have no effective 
implications, while, in return, extracting a price for the ￿concessions￿ granted.  For 
instance, proposals that suggest a de minimis of 20 percent of total agricultural production 
for developing countries should be compared with the total budget of the Ministries of 
Agriculture or similar agencies (after discounting salaries), to see if enough fiscal 
resources to implement the concessions requested exist.  Second, what really matters is 
not a title, such as ￿Development Box￿ or ￿Food Security Box￿, but the content, i.e. the 
possible changes in legal texts that developing countries consider could satisfy their need 
for special and differential treatment. In defining that content developing countries should 
start from the substantial legal room they already have under the AoA, and propose 
specific changes in language utilizing current WTO texts.  It would be most unfortunate 
if developing countries pay a price in the negotiations just because some changes in 
current language are repackaged into a new ￿Box￿ that is then presented as a substantial 
concession from industrialized countries. With those caveats in mind, some of the legal 
and other issues raised by special boxes for development and/or food security reasons, are 
examined in the following section.  
 
Development and Food Security Boxes 
 
During the negotiations and also in academic and civil-society debates, the 
notions of a Development Box and a Food Security Box have been discussed.  Although  
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several of the suggested policies to be included as special and differential treatment 
(SDT) in those boxes are similar (see Tables 11 and 12), there may be a key difference 
regarding the possible users of the SDT.  In principle, a Development Box would come 
under the ￿enabling clause￿ (officially known as the ￿Decision on Differential and More 
Favorable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries￿, 
adopted under GATT in 1979 
16).  This clause, which allows developed members to give 
differential and more favorable treatment to developing countries, has been usually 
interpreted as applying equally to all developing countries (although some additional 
flexibility is allowed for least developed countries).  During the current negotiations 
some of the debate centered on whether the ￿enabling clause￿ should be reopened or not, 
and whether the SDT should or should not be equally available to all developing 
countries (WTO, 2002). A Food Security Box, if defined for food insecure countries 
according to some quantitative indicators, may face less controversy on this regard. 
  A key policy issue in this regard is the discussion about what is the relevant level 
(global, national, household or individual) to address food and nutrition security. The 
special and differential treatment granted at the national level has to be translated into 
adequate policies that operate at the household and individual level to have an impact on 
food and nutrition security. Also, as indicated before, a focus at the level of staple crops 
considered to be relevant for food security may not necessarily be the more effective and 
equitable way to address problems of poverty and hunger.  It is usually more equitable 
and effective to design policies considering vulnerable groups rather than crops or other 
more indirect forms of targeting.  
Another issue is the discussion about granting greater flexibility for development, 
for food security reasons or both, mainly by broad exemptions for some crops from 
disciplines (at the limit excluding them from the AoA), or, rather, by the definition of 
specific exemptions and special treatment (placing them firmly within the AoA).  Usually 
the proposals for greater flexibility are mostly ￿defensive￿, and translate into granting 
more domestic support, imposing higher tariffs for food security reasons, and the use of 
quicker forms of safeguards and trade remedies against foreign subsidies and dumping.  
                                                 
16 The Enabling Clause is the WTO legal basis for the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) (through 
which developed countries offer, unilaterally, non-reciprocal preferential treatment to products originating 
in developing countries), and for regional arrangements and trade concessions among developing countries.   
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Some of those proposals also include more proactive measures such as better market 
access to developed countries￿ markets, binding commitments on food aid and technical 
assistance, and the possibility of international funds and food stocks to help vulnerable 
countries. A summary is presented in Tables 11 and 12. In what follows a possible 




The use of export subsidies has been widely criticized as unfair and disruptive of 
international trade.  In complete contrast with industrial goods, this practice has not yet 
been completely eliminated for agricultural products, many of which are processed 
products.  Therefore, the differential treatment of export subsidies under the current 
agreements of the World Trade Organization (WTO) is not only between primary 
agriculture and industry, but also between those industries based on agricultural raw 
materials (for which export subsidies are allowed) and the rest of the manufacturing 
sector (for which those unfair trade practices have been banned) (Diaz-Bonilla and Reca, 
2000).  Industrialized countries have been the main source of subsidized agricultural 
exports over the years. 
17  Agricultural export subsidies have proved very disruptive both 
for developing countries that are net agricultural exporters, but also for the agricultural 
producers in net importing developing countries, which are displaced by this unfair 
competition.  An important percentage of those export subsidies do not go to the poorest 
countries, and some of the products covered are not necessarily those that may be more 
directly linked to the alleviation of food security problems. Therefore the special 
treatment of agricultural export subsidies should be eliminated in the current negotiations, 
placing them under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. 
A related subject is the operation of state trading enterprises, which may require 
increasing disciplines and transparency on practices that may be equivalent to subsidies 
or dumping on the export side, or hidden trade barriers, on the import side.  Finally, it is 
                                                 
17 From 1986-1997, those export subsidies amounted to about 135 billion US dollars (see Leetmaa and 
Ackerman, 1999, for European and US export subsidies).  That is the equivalent of almost 13 percent of the 
value of all agricultural exports by the developing countries of Africa, LAC and Asia (minus China) 
combined, during the period (Diaz-Bonilla and Reca, 2000).  
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important to integrate in a unified framework the disciplines related to the continuum of 
transactions involving agricultural products, particularly the interface of export subsidies 
with food aid and export credits.   
The developing countries￿ position is to maintain the special and differential 
treatment exempting them from lowering subsidies related to marketing costs and internal 
transport and freight charges (in Article 9 d, and e).  At the same time, developing 
countries have an interest in stricter disciplines on export taxes and export controls that 




A second set of issues is the opportunities for expanded market access.  They will 
depend on increasing the volume of imports allowed under the current regime of tariff-
rate quotas (TRQs); on a more transparent and equitable administration of those TRQs; 
on simplification of some complex tariff structures that include combinations of normal 
and ad-valorem tariffs, complexity which is compounded by seasonal adjustments in 
some cases; on further reduction of tariffs, particularly those still very high in some key 
products, such as fruits and vegetables, sugar, meat and dairy products, among others; 
and on completing the process of tariffication in the cases where exemptions were 
granted.  
Tariffs can be capped to a uniform maximum, probably not more than 50 percent.  
Developing countries should negotiate possible reductions from their bound tariffs rather 
than utilizing applied tariffs, as some industrialized countries have suggested. 
The elimination of tariff escalation is an important subject for developing countries: 
this practice undermines their possibilities of generating local employment and increasing 
the value added of their products.  Tariff escalation has been discussed at least since the 
Kennedy Round (Yeats, 1974).  Although this characteristic of the tariff structure has 
diminished somewhat after the Uruguay Round, significant levels of tariff escalation will 
still remain after the full implementation of the Uruguay Round (Lindland, 1997; OECD, 
1997).  In particular, the OECD (1997) documents important tariff escalation in coffee 
and cocoa products, which can in part explain the increasing share of industrialized  
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countries in the international trade of processed goods using those raw materials (Diaz-
Bonilla and Reca, 2000).  
Another issue of market access is the continuation of the Special Safeguard (SSG) 
established in the AoA.  It was allowed for products that underwent tariffication, but it 
had to be specifically designated for the eligible products.  A total of 38 countries have 
established SSG for about 6072 tariff items; about 3600 tariff items belong to 
industrialized countries (WTO, 2000a).  Developing countries, by and large, resorted to 
binding commitments as an alternative to the tariff equivalent of the existing border 
measures, and therefore could not invoke the SSG.  While some developing countries 
want to eliminate the SSG, others are asking to be able to use it.  In general, the SSG acts 
as a variable levy, is not transparent, and has the potential of being very disruptive of 
trade.  Probably for developing countries it would be more adequate to ask for the 
termination of the SSG, while reserving the possibility of a streamlined safeguard for a 




A third set of issues relates to domestic support.  The final agreement reached at 
the Uruguay Round was weakened when the measure of support was transformed from a 
product-based one to an aggregate value for the whole agricultural sector, and when the 
main domestic subsidies of the European Union and the US (at that time) were kept 
outside the disciplines in what was called the "blue box".  With the changes in the 1996 
Farm Bill in the US, the most important user of Blue Box measures is the European 
Union.  However, the current version of the US Farm Bill brings back domestic subsidies 
to American farmers without the constraints of previous set asides (Orden, 2002) 
On the other hand, many developing countries have dismantled or significantly reduced 
their own domestic support for agricultural producers, mainly because of fiscal 
constraints and concerns about inefficient policies, usually as part of structural 
adjustment programs supported by financial international organizations and aid donors.  
But the possible benefits that these countries and the world may gain from following their 
comparative advantages are drastically thwarted by the subsidies of developed countries.   
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In an attempt to discipline further domestic supports, some countries have proposed to 
tighten the criteria for the Green Box, the reduction of the measure of support by product, 
and the elimination of the exemptions considered under the Blue Box.   
Another suggestion has been to put a cap to all or a specially defined subset of 
domestic support measures as a percentage of the total value of agricultural production 
(WTO, 2000b and 2000c).  The argument that a uniform limit defined in percentages 
would contribute to level the playing field that is now heavily tilted in favor of 
industrialized countries (which have the legal room under the WTO and the money to 
distort production and trade in their favor), seems compelling.  
 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
 
A fourth set of issues relates to sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS), as 
well as other technical, quality, and environmental standards.  These measures can be, 
and have been, used as barriers to trade.  Concerns about the possibility that the 
liberalization of agricultural trade achieved under the AoA could be negated by 
manipulation of those regulations led to the negotiation during the Uruguay Round of two 
separate documents.  The first was the Agreement on SPS measures, directly related to 
human, plant and animal health issues linked to trade in agricultural products.  The 
second was the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), which covered 
technical regulations and standards, and conformity assessment procedures.   
Developing countries have complained over the years that SPS measures and 
inspections tend to become stricter when there are agricultural surpluses in the domestic 
markets of industrialized countries.  They have also criticized the long periods required 
by industrialized countries to complete the pest and disease studies needed to allow the 
import of new agricultural products from developing countries (see Matthews, 1994 for 
other SPS issues).  Since the Uruguay Round Agreement, and in the preliminary 
discussions related to the continuation of the negotiations mandated in Article 20 of the 
AoA, some developing countries have argued for greater flexibility in the implementation 
of their obligations under the SPS Agreement.  Finger and Schuler (2000) have calculated 
the relatively important budgetary costs that some of the operational requirements of  
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different WTO commitments (and not only the SPS Agreement) may impose on low 
income developing countries.  They argued that WTO regulatory issues should be in 
alignment with the real developmental needs of developing countries, separately from 
compliance with WTO legal texts.   
For instance, SPS issues related to human health should be approached as part of 
the improvements needed to protect the local population from food-borne diseases and 
not only as a way to comply with trade regulations.  Similarly, tackling animal and plant 
health problems must be seen as part of SPS requirements to increase production and 
productivity in developing countries. As a general proposition, it seems imbalanced to 
ask low-income countries to devote to the administrative machinery required to 
implement WTO obligations resources that represent, as a percentage of the GDP, a 
larger share than what industrialized countries assign to similar functions.  
On the other hand, a strong SPS framework may be important for developing 
countries, not only because a competitive export position requires establishing and 
maintaining the sanitary and quality requirements for their products, but also as a way of 
improving health conditions in the developing countries, to the extent that best practices 
and standards would then be more widely applied in those countries.  Probably the most 
adequate approach for developing countries is to insist on receiving the technical and 
financial assistance considered in the SPS Agreement (Articles 29 and 30) to build and 
improve their own systems of quality control and health and safety standards.  These 
systems should be centered on their own needs to improve health and sanitary domestic 
conditions, and the regulatory burdens of compliance should, at the very least, not 
represent shares of the GDP larger than what industrialized countries devote to similar 
functions.    
 
Food Security and Poverty 
 
The AoA includes different clauses that are directly or indirectly related to food 
security and poverty issues.  The discussion that follows focuses mostly on legal aspects, 
but it does not analyze the economic advantages or disadvantages of the different 
alternatives.    
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Food Security Stock. The most obvious instrument available in the AoA is the use of 
stocks for food security reasons.  The Green Box measures (Annex 2 of the AoA) include 
￿all support policies provided through a publicly-funded government program not 
involving transfers from consumers￿ and which do ￿not have the effect of providing price 
support to producers￿.  They are exempted from reductions provided they comply with 
other specific criteria established in that Annex (Annex 2, paragraph 1, of the AoA).   
The list of those programs and the specific policy criteria and conditions include, among 
others public stockholding for food security purposes.  The stocks must be an integral 
part of a food security program identified in national legislation.  It may include 
government aid to private storage of products as part of such a program.  They must 
correspond to predetermined targets related solely to food security, the process of stock 
accumulation and disposal must be financially transparent, and the products must be 
bought ￿at current market prices and sales from food security stocks shall be made at no 
less than the current domestic market price for the product and quality in question￿ 
(Annex 2, paragraph 3). 
A footnote in the Annex indicates that ￿governmental stockholding programs for 
food security purposes in developing countries whose operation is transparent and 
conducted in accordance with officially published objective criteria or guidelines shall be 
considered to be in conformity with the provisions of this paragraph, including programs 
under which stocks of foodstuffs for food security purposes are acquired and released at 
administered prices, provided that the difference between the acquisition price and the 
external reference price is accounted for in the AMS.￿ 
Emergency food stocks may have an important role to play in food security 
arrangements.  Carrying stocks as an insurance mechanism is different from using stocks 
to stabilize domestic grain prices, which has proved expensive and relatively ineffective 
(Hazell, 1993; Knudsen and Nash, 1990).  The AoA establishes the conditions for those 
stocks, which must be built based on clearly defined targets, for instance as a percentage 
of total consumption.  Also, it would help public finances to limit the number of key food 
items (no more than three to five) to be stocked.  Hazell (1993) suggests that relatively 
small percentages of total consumption may suffice to act as an insurance mechanism  
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(using McIntire (1981), which calculates that stocks of five percent of total consumption 
may be enough for SSA countries).  Also the AoA requires transparent financial 
arrangements, a sensible requirement to avoid waste and corruption.   
  The key point, though, is that those stocks must be bought and sold at market 
prices.  The language is clear on sales from the stock: those prices are ￿current domestic 
market prices￿ (which includes whatever level of tariff protection the country may have).  
But the text is less clear in the case of buying food products.  As indicated, building 
stocks for food security reasons is different from using stocks to stabilize domestic grain 
prices, which may be very expensive.  For poor countries it makes sense not to add to the 
costs of the food security program through the use of non-market-based administered 
prices, which tend to generate losses buying high to support farmers and selling low to 
subsidize consumers.  In any case, if a government buys at harvest time say 10 percent of 
the production of a crop paying market prices to achieve the stock to consumption ratio 
defined for food security reasons, then that operation would give some price support with 
respect to the counter factual of no intervention (Islam and Thomas, 1996: p 58-61).  But 
all the operations will be conducted at market price, ideally using some sort of auction.  
Following those rules, the program should be part of the Green Box and not subject to 
restrictions on the AMS.     
Some appear to have interpreted the wording of the AoA as either forcing the 
purchase of food items at world prices (because of the reference to the external price, 
which is the one cited in the Schedule of the countries but it is not the current world 
price) or that there are no alternatives to buying at administered prices.  Here a different 
interpretation is offered where buying at the domestic market price the intervention 
remains under the Green Box. The negotiations may add some language to make the text 
clearer, avoiding any doubts about the applicability of this Green Box measure: one 
possibility is that LDCs and countries that are food insecure as defined by some 
objectives indicators are presumed to be in compliance with the AoA when they build 
food security stocks by buying at domestic market prices a small number of pre-specified 
products in volumes not exceeding some limited percentage of domestic consumption 
(for example, stocks for not more than 10 percent of domestic consumption for up to 3 
products).   
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If a developing country decides to use administered prices instead of the prices 
prevailing in the domestic market, then, according to the footnote, the difference with the 
external reference price (which, again, is not the current world price, but the 1986-88 
price established for the original calculations) must be counted as part of the AMS.  Yet, 
if the food security stock does not exceed, say, 10 percent of consumption, it would take 
a relatively large price subsidy (along with a large percentage of imports in domestic 
consumption), for a developing country to exceed the 10 percent de minimis exemption 
per product.  In that case, the program would have changed from food security to price 
support, and it would most likely become financially unsustainable, regardless of its 
status under the AoA.   
 
Domestic Food Aid.  A second instrument for food security, which is also part of 
Green Box measures (Annex 2), is domestic food aid.  According to Annex 2, paragraph 
4, food aid must target the population in need subject to clearly-defined criteria related to 
nutritional objectives; food purchases must be made at market prices; the financing and 
administration of the aid shall be transparent; food aid can be in the form of direct 
provision of food or the provision of means to allow eligible recipients to buy food either 
at market or at subsidized prices.  In the case of developing countries, a footnote indicates 
that ￿for the purposes of paragraphs 3 and 4 of this Annex, the provision of foodstuffs at 
subsidized prices with the objective of meeting food requirements of urban and rural poor 
in developing countries on a regular basis at reasonable prices shall be considered to be in 
conformity with the provisions of this paragraph￿.  Again, the AoA allows food security 
interventions, but imposes some sensible requirements, such as to have a clear plan with 
well-defined nutritional criteria, focusing on ￿population in need￿.  Moreover, in the case 
of developing countries, there may be subsidized interventions for urban and rural poor.  
As in many instances, the issue is not legal restraints under the AoA, but rather how to 
design and finance adequate interventions (see Coady and Skoufias, 2001 for a discussion 
of different interventions)  
  
Support to Poor Producers and Production for Food Security. Although the 
formation of stocks, as indicated, can also help producers if the buying is timed  
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adequately (Islam and Thomas, 1996), the two measures discussed so far operate mostly 
from the consumption, or demand, side.  But developing countries usually emphasize the 
production side of food security.  Several of them have expressed concern that 
agricultural and trade policies may create problems for their large rural populations, 
where poverty is still concentrated and which are basically agricultural producers (WTO 
2000b, 2000c, 2000d, and 2001).  These concerns are related to issues of domestic 
support (how to provide meaningful support to agricultural producers, specially small 
farmers), market access (particularly the impact of further liberalization and how to 
manage import surges), and export subsidies (that may displace local producers).  
Regarding domestic support, it has been already argued that for industrialized and 
developing countries, the AoA allows a great latitude in domestic support policies: Green 
Box measures (Annex 2), Blue box (Article 6, paragraph 5), the de minimis exemptions 
(Article 6, paragraph 4 b), and the fact that the Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS) 
was changed from being product specific to an aggregate for all products (Article 6 
paragraph 1).  Developing countries, in addition to a de minimis exemption of 10 percent 
(as already indicated), were allowed to reduce their levels of domestic support less than 
non-developing members of the WTO and to implement the commitments in a period of 
10 years instead of 6 (article 15, paragraph 2).  Least Developed Countries are completely 
exempt from any reduction in domestic support (Article 15, paragraph 2).  
Additionally, Article 6 paragraph 2 exempts developing countries from reduction 
commitments in yet other categories of domestic support.  They include ￿measures of 
assistance, whether direct or indirect, to encourage agricultural and rural development￿ 
which ￿are an integral part of the development programs of developing countries￿.  The 
article mentions investment subsidies generally available to agriculture; agricultural input 
subsidies to low-income or resource-poor producers; and support to eradicate illicit 
narcotic crops through diversification.  Article 6.2 concludes saying that ￿domestic 
support meeting the criteria of this paragraph shall not be required to be included in a 
Member￿s calculation of its Current Total AMS￿.     
Therefore a developing country is legally entitled under WTO to provide 
additional investment support to their agricultural producers provided that the measures 
are ￿an integral part of development programs of developing countries￿, or, in the case of  
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input subsidies (from credit to fertilizers or water) if they are given to ￿low-income or 
resource- poor producers￿.  By extension of the criteria of the Green Box, it could be 
argued that these interventions would be more protected from challenges, if they were 
part of clearly defined and publicly-funded government program (Annexes 2.1 and 2.5).  
Article 6, paragraph 2 has the advantage, from the point of view of equity, that it 
encourages developing countries to design specific programs for rural development or 
alleviation of rural poverty, instead of resorting to general and non-transparent subsidy 
schemes that may benefit richer farmers or be wasted in corruption.  Article 6.2 would, 
for example, allow the use of input subsidies to poor farmers to promote production of a 
staple crop as part of a rural development program for such producers, without having to 
count those expenditures under the AMS, and therefore, without having to reduce them 
within the WTO commitments.   The only restriction is that those subsidies may be 
actionable under Article 13b, particularly if they exceed the budgetary limit of subsidies 
decided (not necessarily granted) in 1992 by product (13b, ii and iii).   
As an example, suppose that a low-income country decides to subsidize poor 
farmers for their use of fertilizers in a specific staple crop.  Suppose that the program is 
so highly successful that, as a result, poor farmers not only supply the additional domestic 
demand (beginning with their own requirements and including urban population) but also 
displace previous imports in that product.  Suppose further that the expenditures of the 
program in that low-income country have exceeded those approved for that crop in 1992.  
Then those countries that were suppliers of that market and that now may have been 
displaced, may claim ￿serious prejudice￿ (as in Article XVI, paragraph 1, of GATT 1994 
or Articles 5 and 6 of the Subsidies Agreement), or ￿non-violation nullification￿ or 
￿impairment of the benefits of tariff concessions￿ (as in Article XXIII, paragraph 1(b) of 
GATT, 1994).  Some have interpreted Article 13 as prohibiting domestic subsidies in 
excess of 1992 budgetary limits (Solagral, 1999).  In fact, those subsidies are not 
prohibited, but may be ￿actionable￿, meaning that the complaining WTO member must 
support its claim proving either serious prejudice, on one hand, or nullification or 
impairment of benefits, on the other.   
The whole scenario for such complaints appears unlikely for most, if not all, poor 
developing countries, because it must combine a highly successful program that displaces  
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imports (when in fact most of the production of such a product would go to expanded 
domestic consumption) or reduces prices significantly in the domestic market, and the 
existence of a significant export market prior to the program (to make it commercially 
worthwhile to initiate a WTO complaint).  Also, there must be a WTO member (basically 
an industrialized country or a higher income developing country, considering the origin 
of most food exports), willing to incur in the public relations costs to sue a poor country 
on a program aimed at poor farmers for production of food.  Yet because the unlikely 
sometimes happen (particularly difficult to judge given the willingness of different 
governments in the WTO members to place human decency concerns above other 
considerations), the current agricultural negotiations may be well advised to clarify in 
greater detail the interface between the de minimis exemption (Article 6.2, and Article 
13) particularly for poor countries with problems of food insecurity.   
A possibility is to follow the same approach as for food stocks and include 
language in the AoA specifying that LDCs and countries that are food insecure as defined 
by some objectives indicators, are exempted from the 1992 limits of Article 13, not only 
in regard to Article 6.2, but also regarding the de minimis exemption for two or three 
crops designated for food security reasons.   
Another issue linked to Article 6.2 is the meaning of ￿low-income or resource 
poor producers￿ (LI/RP).  A possible approach is to take the usual measure of one dollar 
(or two dollars) a day, as the poverty line used for international comparisons, or a relative 
measure within the country (for instance, producers with less than 40 percent of national 
income per capita).  In general, if food insecure countries are defined according to 
objective criteria, some language can be included to the effect that they are presumed in 
compliance with the criteria of Article 6.2. for low income and resource poor producers.  
Other developing countries that are not food insecure will have to show that the small 
farmers supported fall under the quantity limits for incomes.  
 
Special Safeguard (SSG) and Other Trade Remedies for Food Security. As 
mentioned, the SSG is available only to countries, mostly developed ones, which have 
border tariffs.  Some developing countries have argued for extending the utilization of the 
SSG also to them.  Other developing countries, however, want the SSG eliminated and a  
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new special safeguard created for food security reasons.  Conceivably this can be done 
under the common safeguard of the Emergency Action on Imports of Particular Products 
(Article XIX of GATT 1994), but including some modifications such as (i) streamlined 
and faster procedures for a limited number of designated crops for food security reasons, 
and (ii) exemptions from the need to offer compensations, linked to the temporary use of 
the safeguard (see Sharma 2000). 
Similarly, streamlined procedures can be defined to counter export subsidies (and, 
conceivably, also dumping activities) that may affect the group of two or three designated 
crops with food security implications in food insecure countries.  An important first step 
in that direction, which would benefit all developing countries, would be to apply the 
common WTO rules for export and other subsidies in the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (ASCM) (including the possibility of claiming serious prejudice 
because of domestic subsidies of industrialized countries), instead of using, as is now the 
case, the stricter requirements of Article 13 of the AoA to apply countervailing duties and 
seek other trade remedies.  In the case of the designated food security crops for food 
insecure countries, the latter may be allowed to apply provisional measures 
(countervailing duties) under Article 17 of the ASCD with more streamlined procedures 
than those considered in article 17.1 (a), (b) and (c); those procedures can be initiated by 
the government; and the countervailing duties can be applied before the period indicated 
in 17.3 and last for longer periods than the four months indicated in 17.4.  
 
Food Aid, Access to Food, Foreign Aid, and Price Volatility. Current 
negotiations should also consider carefully other issues of food availability and price 
volatility.  A general concern is the provision of adequate levels of food aid, which have 
declined in recent years, and the avoidance of cycles that tend to reinforce, instead of 
counteract, situations of oversupply and shortages (i.e. the fact that there is excess of food 
aid when world supplies are abundant and lack of it when supply conditions are tight).  
Food aid should be made available in grant form; focused towards poor countries and 
social groups; and delivered in ways that do not displace domestic production in the 
receiving countries.    
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It is also necessary to provide technical assistance and financial support to 
develop agriculture in food insecure countries, and to maintain and expand financial 
facilities (both multilateral and bilateral) to help with short-term difficulties in financing 
food imports.  A special aspect is to make sure that export controls and export bans on 
food items are tightly disciplined so as not to hamper access to food by importing 
countries.  Improvements in early warning systems of food shortages, in weather forecast, 
and in transportation and storage, along with an adequate programming of food aid and 
financial facilities for emergencies, should help net food importers.   
The issue of volatility in agricultural prices must also be monitored carefully. As 
shown in Table 7 volatility of real agricultural prices in world markets in the last half of 
the 1990s￿since the implementation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
agricultural agreements￿does not seem to be higher than it has been for the whole period 
since the 1960s, and is even lower for some products. Yet, it is less clear what has 
happened with the volatility of agricultural prices within developing countries, which also 
depends on domestic policies.   For the lowest income brackets of the population food 
constitutes 50 percent or higher of total expenditure (FAO, 1993).  The poor are therefore 
the most vulnerable to large swings in food prices.  At the same time, however, if 
domestic price stabilization schemes maintain prices higher on average than what would 
have been the case without them, then there may be a trade off for the poor:  trade 
liberalization may lead to more volatile but lower prices on average, while with 
stabilization schemes prices albeit more stable would be higher possibly making more 
people food insecure (Sumner, 2000).  In any case, it is important to devise mechanisms, 
consistent with WTO commitments, to provide adequate safety nets for those more 
vulnerable and the worst hit.  Further analysis is needed on the potential costs and 





Can the WTO legal framework protect the interests of the world’s poor and 
hungry? Obviously, the WTO cannot make sure that everyone on the planet gets enough  
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to eat. But it can help to prevent unfair competition that hurts the poor. In the negotiations 
developing countries are legitimately insisting that industrialized countries reduce their 
higher levels of subsidies and protection first.  The possible negative effects on some 
developing countries of higher food prices and lost preferences caused by the 
liberalization of markets in rich countries are better addressed through cash grants or 
other financial schemes to compensate those countries affected, rather than maintaining 
protection in the industrialized world.   Also, WTO country members may need to set up 
a new category of "food-insecure" countries, and make sure that they have the policy 
instruments to protect the livelihoods of the rural poor.  Some of the SDT discussed in the 
previous sections has been cast in terms of countries and crops. However, it is important 
to remember that policy interventions based on countries or crops may not necessarily 
address the problems of specific poor farmers and poor consumers, and may have larger 
leakages and secondary distorting effects. For instance, increasing protection for food 
crops acts as a regressive tax, with a larger incidence on poor consumers and whose 
benefits accrue mostly to larger farmers.  If the concern is about vulnerable groups it is 
better to target them for investments and subsidies (an approach accepted under the 
AoA).  Many of the food security concerns can be addressed with specific clarifications 
and changes in the current language of the AoA, whether they are called ￿development￿ 
or ￿food security￿ boxes or not.  While seeking the changes suggested (or some others) in 
the negotiations, food insecure developing countries may want to ensure that they are not 
asking for legal room to implement policies that they will not be able to utilize later 
because lack of financial resources.  One of the main imbalances in world agriculture is 
that industrialized countries have enough legal room under the WTO to subsidize their 
own agriculture and the resources to do it, while many developing countries although 
may not be legally constrained to invest in food security, lack the financial, human, and 
institutional resources to do it.  This should be recognized by ensuring that agricultural 
trade negotiations proceed in parallel with increased funding by international and 
bilateral organizations for agricultural and rural development, food security, and rural 
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Table 1.  Calories per capita per day 
 
Source: D￿az-Bonilla et al., 2002  
 
 
Table 2.  Proteins per capita per day (grams) 




Table 3.  Number of malnourished children since 1970 
 
Regions  1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1997 
  (millions of children under age 5) 
Latin America and the Caribbean  9.5 8.2 6.2 5.7 6.2 5.2  5.1
Sub-Saharan Africa  18.5 18.5 19.9 24.1 25.7 31.4  32.7
West Asia/North Africa  5.9 5.2 5.0 5.0 n.a. 6.3  5.9
South Asia  92.2 90.6 89.9 100.1 95.4 86.0  85.0
East Asia  77.6 45.1 43.3 42.8 42.5 38.2  37.6
         
All regions  203.8 167.6 164.3 177.7 176.7 167.1  166.3
Source: Smith and Haddad (2000) from 1970 through 1995; 1997 data are the IMPACT base-
year values extrapolated from 1995 values using the IMPACT model (Rosegrant et al, 2001). 
Note: n.a. is not available. 
  1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s  1995-99  Last/60  Last/70 Last/80
World  2347 2453 2636 2750 2790  1.189  1.137  1.058 
Industrialized  Countries  2956 3079 3201 3337 3359  1.136  1.091  1.049 
Developing  Countries  2036 2173 2424 2607 2667  1.310  1.227  1.100 
Least  Developed  Countries 2016 2018 2078 2067 2073  1.029  1.028  0.998 
Africa  South  of  Sahara  2070 2077 2075 2160 2189  1.058  1.054  1.055 
Transition  Markets  3236 3366 3383 2992 2906  0.898  0.864  0.859 
  1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s  1995-1999 Last/60  Last/70 Last/80
World  64 65 70 73 75    1.170  1.143  1.074 
Industrialized  Countries  90 94 99  103  104    1.155  1.103  1.050 
Developing  Countries  51 53 59 66 68    1.326  1.278  1.148 
Least  Developed  Countries  50 51 51 51 51    1.008  1.006  0.990 
Africa  South  of  Sahara  53 52 51 52 53    1.000  1.009  1.024 
Transition  Markets  97  102  103  90  86   0.887 0.842 0.834  
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  Table 4     Volatility for food production 
1961-2000 1991-2000 1995-2000 
Asia   0.150 0.100 0.050
Africa   0.110 0.080 0.060
LAC   0.110 0.080 0.050
EU   0.060 0.040 0.030
Japan  0.050 0.040 0.030
US  0.050 0.040 0.020
Source: D￿az-Bonilla et al., 2002 
 Table 5     Volatility for calories consumption
1961-2000 1991-2000 1995-2000 
Asia  0.051 0.030 0.012
Africa  0.056 0.031 0.014
LAC  0.041 0.022 0.010
EU   0.023 0.016 0.007
Japan  0.012 0.004 0.001
US  0.014 0.006 0.005
Source: D￿az-Bonilla et al., 2002 
 Table 6     Volatility for protein consumption
1961-2000 1991-2000 1995-2000 
Asia   0.057 0.034 0.019
Africa  0.063 0.038 0.020
LAC  0.055 0.037 0.017
EU   0.024 0.017 0.008
Japan  0.020 0.007 0.008
US  0.022 0.006 0.002




 Table 7.     Coefficient of Variability for Price: constant value
1960-1999 1990s 1995-1999
Cocoa (cents/kg)  0.54 0.14 0.13 
Coffee Mild (cents/kg)  0.40 0.29 0.21 
Coffee Robusta (cents/kg)  0.55 0.26 0.14 
Tea (cents/kg)  0.20 0.19 0.21 
Sugar (cents/kg)  0.81 0.16 0.17 
Orange ($/mt)  0.11 0.08 0.01 
Banana ($/mt)  0.11 0.12 0.11 
Beef (cents/kg)  0.21 0.13 0.06 
Wheat ($/mt)  0.22 0.14 0.16 
Rice ($/mt)  0.34 0.13 0.07 
Maize ($/mt)  0.21 0.16 0.17 
Sorghum ($/mt)  0.21 0.13 0.15 
Coconut Oil ($/mt)  0.36 0.29 0.15 
Soybean Oil ($/mt)  0.30 0.18 0.13 
Groundnut Oil ($/mt)  0.28 0.15 0.08 
Palm Oil ($/mt)  0.30 0.29 0.19 
Soybean ($/mt)  0.22 0.11 0.12 
Soybean Meal ($/mt)  0.27 0.16 0.21 
Cotton (cents/kg)  0.19 0.14 0.12 
Source: D￿az-Bonilla et al., 2002  
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Table 8.  Developing countries with worsening indicators for calories and proteins 
 
Source: D￿az-Bonilla et al., 2002 






 Countries with lower indicators in 1990s 
than in 1960s and than the group average 
in 1990s 
Countries with lower indicators in 1990s 
than in 1980s and than the group average in 
1990s 
Level Calories  26 (20%)  37 (28%) 
Level Proteins  33 (25%)  42 (32%) 
 
 Countries with higher indicators in 1990s 
than in 1960s, and than the group average 
in 1990s 
Countries with higher indicators in 1990s 
than in 1980s, and than the group average in 
1990s 
Volatility Calories  23 (17%)  16 (12%) 
Volatility Proteins  23 (17%)  21 (16%)  
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Share of food 









Cluster-1 1,982.9  48.6 81.8 4.9 20.4  0.23
Cluster-2 2,229.2  58.8 117.6 5.3 19.0  0.71
Cluster-3 2,244.6  52.6 120.3 14.1 7.1  0.41
Cluster-4 2,581.5  70.8 157.2 4.8 20.8  0.39
Cluster-5 2,602.3  66.5 210.4 11.3 8.8  0.75
Cluster-6 2,672.9  72.8 124.1 19.8 5.0  0.41
Cluster-7 2,976.1  82.7 135.1 9.1 11.0  0.82
Cluster-8 2,827.7  78.4 233.3 25.6 3.9  0.83
Cluster-9 3,231.3 100.1 254.2 18.6 5.4  0.88
Cluster-10 3,271.8  97.7 304.2 35.9 2.8  0.93
Cluster-11 3,303.7  103.3 520.6 17.7 5.7  0.93
Cluster-12 3,374.1  107.5 923.9 32.7 3.1  0.93
 
Source: Diaz-Bonilla et al. (2000). 
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Table 10.  Country membership in Cluster 1 to 12  
 
   LDC  NFIDC  Others 
WTO members  Angola, Bangladesh, Burkina 
Faso, Burundi, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Dem Republic 
of Congo, Gambia, Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, 
Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, 
Sierra Leone, United Rep of 
Tanzania, Uganda 
Kenya  





Others Afghanistan,  Comoros,  Eritrea, 
Liberia, Somalia 
  
WTO members  Djibouti, Lesotho  Botswana, Cuba, Dominican 
Republic, Honduras, Peru 
El Salvador, Georgia, 
Mongolia, Nicaragua 
WTO observers      Armenia, Azerbaijan  
2. 
(14)  
Others     Tajikistan 
WTO members  Solomon Islands, Togo, Zambia  C￿te d’Ivoire, Sri Lanka  Bolivia, Cameroon, Republic 
of Congo, Ghana, Guatemala, 
India, Namibia, Papua New 
Guinea, Philippines, 
Zimbabwe 
WTO observers  Laos„    Viet Nam 
3. 
(17)  
Others      
WTO members  Benin, Mauritania, Senegal  Pakistan, Saint Lucia   Albania, Grenada, Saint Kitts 
and Nevis, Saint 
Vincent/Grenadines 























(13)   
Others Kiribati     
WTO members    Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Venezuela 
Belize, Brazil, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Ecuador, Fiji 
Islands, Guyana, Kyrgyzstan, 
Nigeria, Paraguay, Suriname, 
Swaziland 
WTO observers      Croatia, Macedonia (The 




Others      
WTO members  Myanmar    Antigua and Barbuda, Gabon, 
Indonesia 
WTO observers      China 
6. 
(5) 
Others      
WTO members  Maldives  Barbados, Egypt, Mauritius, 
Morocco, Tunisia 
Brunei Darussalam, 
Dominica, Estonia, Jordan, 
Kuwait, Macau, Mexico 
 
WTO observers  Cape Verde    Algeria, Lebanon, Russian 
Federation, Saudi Arabia 
7 
(14). 
Others      Bahamas, Islamic Rep of 
Iran, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 
Syrian Arab Republic 
WTO members      Bulgaria, Chile, Republic of 
Korea, Latvia, Malaysia, 
Republic of Moldova, 
Panama, Slovakia, South 
Africa 




























Table 10. Continued 
 
   LDC  NFIDC  Others 
WTO members      Czech Republic, Germany, 
Iceland, Israel, Japan, 
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, 
Turkey, United Arab 
Emirates, United Kingdom 
WTO observers      Belarus, Kazakhstan  
9 . 
(16)   
Others      
WTO members      Austria, China--Hong Kong 
SAR, Finland, Hungary, 
Norway, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United States of 
America 
WTO observers      Ukraine 
10. 
(9) 
Others      
WTO members      Argentina, Belgium-
Luxembourg, Canada, France, 
Greece, Italy, Netherlands, 
Spain, Uruguay 
WTO observers       
11. 
(9)  
Others      
WTO members      Australia, Denmark, Ireland 
WTO observers       
12. 
(3)   

































WTO members      New Zealand, Thailand 
 
Source: Diaz-Bonilla et al (2000). 
Notes: WTO members not included because of data unavailability:  Bahrain, Cyprus, Liechtenstein, Qatar and 
Singapore. 
LDC: Least Developing Countries.  LDC not included because of data unavailability:  Bhutan, Equatorial Guinea, 
Samoa, Sao Tome Principe, and Tuvalu.  
NFIDC: Net Food Importing Developing Countries. 
The majority of countries have been classified in the same group by all three clustering methods; the countries in 
bold have been classified in the same group by two out the three clustering methods.   
„ Countries in the process of accession to the WTO.       
Number of countries in a cluster is in parenthesis.   
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Table 11.  The Development Box: principles and instruments 
 
  
Principles    
  Specific provisions, which are at best minimally trade distorting and yet are 
able to provide DC with the required flexibility to adopt the domestic 
agricultural policies, which will ensure the objectives 
Objectives   
  Applies only to developing countries  
  Enhances flexibility not prescribes specific policies  
  Targets low income and resource poor (LI/RP) farmers 
  Focuses on ￿food security crops￿ (staple or main crops of LI/RP farmers, 
which are usually for domestic production 
  Addresses specific problems of NFIDCs 
Instruments and measures 
  Establish a ￿positive list￿ to indicate agricultural crops that would be subject 
to reduction commitments but would exclude staple food security crops. 
  Keeping with the condition of total domestic support below the de minimis 
level, DC would maintain appropriate levels of tariff bindings as a S&D 
measure 
  Allowed to re-negotiate low tariff bindings in relation to food security crops. 
  Quota and tariff-free access in developed countries to products important to 
developing countries￿ LI/RP farmers 
  Expand Article 6.2 to include support to LI/RP producers such as subsidized 
credit and other capacity building measures, input subsidies or other product 
specific support, infrastructure assistance such as any spending on 
transportations costs from surplus areas to deficit areas of food security crops 
 Compute  de minimis requirement on an aggregate basis 
  Greater assistance to LI/RP producers under Annex 2, paragraph 13 on 
regional assistance programs. 
  Expand the Safeguard measure to all developing countries as part of the AoA. 
  Dumping should be prohibited. 
  Penalty measures that are triggered when domestic production in DC, or non-
subsidized exports, are displaced by subsidized production in other countries. 
  Technical and financial assistance to LDCs and NFIDCs  to improve 
agricultural productivity, facilitate agricultural development and avoid the 
long-term dependency on food imports. 
  International fund from major agricultural exporters, to help LDCs and 
NFIDCs obtain their food requirements from international markets. 
  The Peace clause (Article 13) should not be renewed and DC measures under 




Table 12.  Food Security  
 
Tariffs  
  Developing countries should be able to maintain appropriate levels of tariff 
bindings.  
 
  Should be able to rationalize their zero or low tariff bindings. 
  A priori reduction in the trade distorting domestic support and export subsidies 
by developed countries 
Market Access 
  Quota and tariff free markets access from developed countries specially for 
exports produced by LI/RP farmers. 
  Elimination of tariff peaks and tariff escalation by developed countries. 
  Elimination of non-tariffs barriers by developed countries (Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary measures). 
Domestic Support 
  All domestic support measures taken by developing countries for food security, 
rural development, and poverty alleviation should be exempted. 
  Expand Article 6.2 to LI/RP producers, staple foods for domestic consumption, 
and spending on transportation. 
  Additional flexibility over and above the de minimis level 
Export Subsidies 
  Export subsidies by developed countries should be eliminated. 
  Export subsidies by developing countries should be allowed when critical to 
food security needs 
Marrakesh Decision (LDCs and NFIDCs) 
  Assistance at times of high prices/low domestic production 
  Technical and financial assistance by developed country agricultural exporters 
to improve agricultural productivity in these groups. 
  International fund by major agricultural exporters. 
Food Aid and Food Security Stocks 
  Wider definition under the Green Box for food stocks policies  
  The AoA should provide for joint maintenance of regional emergency stocks 
and encourage financial support from developed countries. 
  Food aid as a means of disposing of price-depressing surpluses from developed 
countries should be should not be exploited.  It should be demand/request 
driven and targeted at the needs of the recipient country. 
Other Provisions 
  Agricultural safeguard to protect small and marginal farmers against cheap 
import surges. 
  Prohibit dumping and developing countries should be able to retaliate with 
border measures. 
  Penalty against subsidized production which displaces domestic production 
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Figure 4.  Scatter plot of consumption per capita (average of calories and proteins 
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